

REVIEWS

The Culture of Classicism: Ancient Greece and Rome in American Intellectual Life, 1780-1910, by Caroline Winterer. Baltimore & London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, 244 pp., \$45.00 hardbound.

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It is odd that Americans still regularly cite Alexis de Tocqueville's candid observations on our democratic spirit, from the importance of civic associations and religion, to the threats to independent thinking and local liberty, to the mixed character of American education. True, we more often cite his praise than his warnings; one of his prescient concerns was democracy's intolerance for those who question its tendencies. He thought its true friends should address its weaknesses, but he expected apostles of the new faith to scorn his warnings about democratic immoderation and shallow souls.

Tocqueville correctly forecast the spread of this groupthink beyond politics to philosophic, religious, and educational thought. This hard reality captures the underlying story of Caroline Winterer's study of classical education in America from the late eighteenth to early twentieth centuries, but it also might explain her caution in recounting the tale. After all, *The Culture of Classicism* chronicles the losing side, the case for liberal education in the great works of ancient Greece and Rome.

The prevailing spirit of higher education today largely is skeptical about standards of morals, epistemology, or transcendent truth apart from our faith in democracy and material progress. We

do not want to hear warnings from Tocqueville, let alone from some professor, linking the classics, liberal education, and the fate of the human soul in modern democracy. Winterer recounts the main events and players in this saga, but she leaves it to the reader to ponder its meaning. This is, nonetheless, no small service toward grasping the challenges to higher learning, and to principled self-government, in America today.

Winterer, an assistant professor of history at San Jose State University, argues that "[n]ext to Christianity, the central intellectual project in America before the late nineteenth century was classicism." From the 1630s (the founding of Harvard), Americans were "dazzled" by the ancient Greeks and Romans, and "reverence for ancient models helped to structure ethical, political, oratorical, artistic, and educational ideas, sometimes overtly, sometimes subtly." From 1880 to 1910, she argues, massive changes within classics and in American intellectual life pushed aside this once central discipline to "the byways of elite, high culture, where it remains today." Winterer portrays this dispassionately, as "less a story of decline than of transformation," arguing that American classicists struggled throughout the nineteenth century simultaneously to defend and reinvent classical education.

As American politics, economics, and society became more egalitarian and dynamic, such education in character formation—a rigorous moral and intellectual program to develop human nature to its fullest potential—seemed increasingly elitist and remote. By the era of Jackson, classicists openly de-

fended such study precisely for its remoteness, as an antidote to modern crassness and individualism. The vanguard of scientific, secular, utilitarian education portrayed study of Greek and Latin as undemocratic, backward, and amateurish. Within decades it was clear which side had won. Still, Winterer finds consolation amidst this revolution toward specialization, utilitarian aims, and the leveling of all disciplines.

By the twentieth century, she claims, the “classicists’ idea of the cultured person, fluent in the humanities, represented nothing if not a huge ideological victory.” The model of the broadly educated and “conscientious citizen,” thus of “the ideal of liberal learning,” was adopted by the new “humanities” disciplines. The legacy of “classicism as a critique of modern materialism and civic degeneracy” was bequeathed to fitting successors.

The Culture of Classicism is particularly instructive about notions of scholarship itself, pondering “the transformation of American ideals . . . from the general learning valued in the eighteenth century to the specialization so prized in the twentieth.” Winterer chronicles the introduction of German scholarship in the mid-nineteenth century, which emphasized the historical particularity of thought and culture, and scientific analysis of texts and linguistic meanings. She candidly analyzes how this historicism, adopted by American classicists to be rigorous and up-to-date, in fact destroyed classics from within. The story of a brilliant classical philologist of this era named Nietzsche alone reveals the danger historicism posed for classics—indeed, for all serious, Socratic learning,

whatever the discipline. Winterer, however, harbors some of that Germanic spirit, and she is softer on these issues than she might be. There is no mention of Nietzsche or Heidegger or the subsequent crisis of meaning in humanities or social sciences, even while she chronicles the nuts and bolts of classicist pedagogy from the seventeenth to the late nineteenth century in America.

For larger reflections about the consequences for liberal learning and higher education, one should seek out Eva Brann’s *Paradoxes of Education in a Republic*, or, in a more combative mode, Allan Bloom’s *The Closing of the American Mind*, E. Christian Kopff’s *The Devil Knows Latin: Why America Needs the Classical Tradition*, or, from Victor Davis Hanson and John Heath, *Who Killed Homer: The Demise of Classical Education and the Recovery of Greek Wisdom*. That said, perhaps Winterer is as prudent as the statesman Diodotus in Thucydides’s account of the Athenian assembly reversing a decision to slaughter the adult males in a tributary city, Mytilene (*History of the Peloponnesian War*, 3.35-49). Diodotus persuaded the assemblymen to do the just thing not by appealing to their sense of justice, but by speaking to them on their own terms of calculations about interest and power. So, too, perhaps if administrators and senior professors in higher education read *The Culture of Classicism*, it would do more good than asking them to read Bloom or Hanson or Kopff. The latter scold the barbarians inside the gate for their ignorance about true learning, or about truly diverse views of “humane” learning. Winterer gently suggests a similar conclusion in the prevailing language of the mo-

ment—rigorously documented social scientific historical research, objective and non-polemical, recounting what has been lost.

As Winterer unfolds her story she mentions both Locke and Bacon as primary sources for the new modes and aims of learning that undermined the classicist orthodoxy of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century America. One advantage of her detailed recounting of American college curricula and intellectual life through the late nineteenth century is that one learns, or is reminded, how well-versed in classical literature were the statesmen, poets, orators, lawyers, preachers, educators, and leading citizens of our first centuries. This awareness itself is a version of the opportunity that classical study promised, to step out of one's current cave, its interior so persistently maintained by scholars and public intellectuals seeking tenure or current fame.

At its best or its core, classical education sought truths about an enduring human nature through study of the great competing views offered by ancient Western poets, philosophers, historians, and statesmen. As recently as Locke and Mill, Emerson and Lincoln, leading modern liberals argued that the roots and principles of liberalism required some understanding of the classics. Winterer rightly suggests that the secular or linear view of history held by many such European and American figures (I would exempt Lincoln) contained the seeds of revolution, despite any exhortations about knowing the Greeks and Romans.

This suggests, however, a problem with Winterer's initial claim, that, be-

sides Christianity, classicism was *the* central intellectual project in America. This overlooks the mixed character of America's founding principles from the seventeenth century, an amalgam of ideas reaffirmed by our political founders in the late eighteenth century—partly modern, partly ancient, partly Christian. The explicit requirements in American colleges up through the mid-nineteenth century, as Winterer recounts them, are not a true reflection of the larger intellectual project that America was undertaking, especially regarding the importance of Enlightenment and modern liberal philosophy. The demise of higher liberal education could come so quickly in the late nineteenth century because the seeds of destruction had long been planted, even if they were more or less dormant for some time.

Tocqueville grasps precisely this intellectual struggle and dilemma in the 1830s, but receives only a passing mention from Winterer. His deep insight into America's fundamental principles, employing the lens of history but not adopting an historical determinism, allows him to discern the causes of the demise of the Federalists, the "aristocratic" party in America (*Democracy in America*, Vol. I, Part 2, ch. 2). Similarly, he appreciated that the study of Greek and Latin literature would be the province of a few, and that the predominant spirit in American higher education would be "scientific, commercial, and industrial rather than literary" or philosophic—thus forecasting the decline that Winterer charts from the 1880s.

Nonetheless, Tocqueville thought it "important" that there always remain "a

few excellent universities" to educate students in the "spirit" of the classics, and he clearly thought that such a spirit, while flawed, was a better "diet" for the human soul than the utilitarian, prosaic education that would characterize the majority fare (Vol. II, Part 1, ch. 15). His prediction of the demise of classics, and the rise of Deweyan pragmatism and the modern research university, were one piece of his larger warning about the corrosive effects upon the human soul of democratic equality, modern materialism, and Cartesian rationalism. He cautions that the Greeks and Romans inhabited caves of their own, and Tocqueville himself looks to medieval and modern Western thought, and even non-Western thought, throughout the work.

Still, he urges modern democrats to read classical literature for its extraordinary care and thoughtfulness, attention to detail, and constant "search for ideal beauty." Tocqueville extends this thought to history, philosophy, and politics, recommending the salutary effects of ancient and non-Western views about the importance of great statesmen in human affairs and about the immortality of the soul—to counterbalance modern materialism, egalitarianism, and theories about "forces" controlling history (II.1.20; II.2.15).

The decline and transformation of classical education Winterer recounts makes one wonder whether higher education has been as good a friend to democracy in America as Tocqueville was. To some degree, she is right to suggest that the survival into the twentieth century of "the humanities" as the standard of elite, cultured education is some con-

solation; Tocqueville would remind us that we could not expect genuinely higher education to be a mass project. On the other hand, Winterer is too sanguine in characterizing the humanities as a "huge ideological victory." She provides no history of the term, but a main source was the degree at Cambridge, Oxford, and their American progeny in *literae humaniores*, humane letters. These programs eventually blended classical and related modern studies, but the current humanities too often have lost the balance and depth of these forbears.

Moreover, the humanities survive today not within a democracy of the disciplines that replaced the classicist hierarchy; they serve, or are tolerated by, the new priesthood of natural scientists, engineers, and other vocationalists. The latter tend to advocate, for example, human cloning in one form or another, flush with such power while indicating little understanding of the consequences for the very definition of humanity. This is not entirely their fault, for higher education now largely is closed to the sources of such knowledge. When Mary Shelly dubbed her power-drunk scientist "the modern Prometheus," the image powerfully illuminated her Dr. Frankenstein because the nineteenth-century world understood the moral tale developed by Greek civilization about the mixed quality of, or moral dilemmas posed by, any technology, even fire.

My own discipline, political science and particularly political theory, finds specialists too often trapped by current thinking—egalitarian, divorced from nature, and heavily quantitative and methodological, or, at the opposite extreme, theorizing only about contempo-

rary intuitions. A recent tribute to the late John Rawls by a noted classicist praised him for lecturing not on his own works but on the history of ethics and political philosophy, but neither Rawls nor even this classicist saw any problem with defining that history as beginning with Locke and featuring Kant, Mill, and later liberals. Only the quaint oddball or the crank suggests we have much to learn from the observations on politics and human nature of Thucydides, Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero, providing us some wider perspective for measuring our contemporary dilemmas in social science, democracy, and international affairs. These, however, were the first thinkers in our tradition to link intellectual, moral, and spiritual self-government with communal liberty and self-government.

To take only one paradox of American power today, as we ponder how to exercise our extraordinary global dominance: it was a century ago, precisely as classical education in America declined, that we first began to acquire an appetite for empire or hegemony. Now that we are a great hegemon, the hole left by our ignorance of the classics should be felt all the more keenly. One wonders what leader in the liberal democracies today could echo Secretary of State George Marshall's remarks of 1947, on the significance of the Peloponnesian War for an understanding of his own world: "I doubt seriously whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the fall of Athens." Study of Thucydides today might

teach us not only the dangers of failing to be clear about our standards of right and justice, but also the danger of failing to balance our justice with some awareness of how others perceive, and are threatened by, our power. Such failures, Thucydides suggests, led to the ultimate destruction of both Athens and Sparta.

Professor Winterer deserves our thanks for pointing the way to consideration of such issues, providing those with ears to hear the resources to understand how higher education in America has transformed itself and changed its aims. The fact that these issues are raised at all, if only by a few in higher education, suggests that the embers of truly higher learning have not died out.

The rise in recent decades of the National Association of Scholars and the American Academy of Liberal Education; the vibrancy of the two St. John's College campuses and other Great Books programs; the wide currency of warnings by Jacques Barzun, E. D. Hirsch, and Harold Bloom on the need for education in the broader Western tradition—all of these are signs that our minds are not completely closed. Sunlight can come from unexpected sources, such as the recent testimony by professed amateur David Denby about returning to Columbia's program in liberal education, *Great Books: My Adventures with Homer, Rousseau, Woolf, and Other Indestructible Writers of the Western World*.

One need not argue that classics, or the classics of the entire Western tradition, are the only legitimate mode of university learning to suggest the lack of balance in the American university today. The spirit of a Socrates, or

Thucydides, or Tocqueville still urges us to transcend the confines of our cave to explore the higher realms of higher education.

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An Introduction to Multicultural Education, Third Edition, by James A. Banks. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 2002, 172 pp., \$31.00 paperback.

Robert F. Lawson

This is a simple book. It articulates common assumptions of multicultural education, to wit: races other than Caucasian have common economic and political cause in the United States, and by extension, though without clarification, in the world; multicultural education is the vehicle in the schools, paralleling liberal media of diversity generally, for replacement of the western *Kulturgut*. Because these assumptions and their corollaries are laced through the book redundantly, this review distinguishes among the author's approaches to knowledge, to society, and to teaching.

Although simply written and conceived, the message is clearly intentional:

"to reconstruct the mainstream American metanarrative" (x). Therefore, my view of the book is admittedly colored by the value I place on Western civilization and the "American experiment," by my belief in science as bound by empirically verifiable structures and theories (at least during the life of a paradigm), and by my respect for many of the authors whom Banks repeatedly minimizes (e.g., Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.).

When I say it is a simple book, I refer to style, substance, and reasoning. To start with technicalities, data are used superficially and repetitively. There is no argument with data showing, for example, that the ethnic minority population is growing. The problem is with the continual use of data generalizations, therefore unexamined data, to reach the conclusions embedded in his premises. Similarly, references are very general (e.g., Bell, Toffler, 36, Myrdal, 55), isolated from the source literature (e.g., Collins an "outsider-within," 16, "Revolution," 59), used to support a generalization, e.g., "errors made within the dominant knowledge tradition" (Minnich, 16), or to discredit opponents (D'Souza, Leo, Schlesinger, 27). A significant proportion of the book is given over to diarizing experiences from teaching; to the record of an interview; to numerous charts, figures, and lists ("spiral developments of concepts," "data retrieval chart on revolutions," "multicultural benchmarks," etc.); and appendices on "essential principles" (three pages), the "Nebraska Multicultural Education Bill" (three pages), and a "Checklist for Evaluation of Informational Materials." To treat each of these is beyond the scope of this review.

They do represent the way in which knowledge has been trivialized in education, and politicized in multicultural education, however.

For traditional scholars, the problems with Banks's treatment of knowledge are probably greatest since they involve logic, causation, understanding of fact and interpretation, use of science and philosophy, connection of knowledge and morality, and conventions of intellectual communication. Multicultural education is presented here as an end in itself, as a moral imperative, as the principle of curriculum construction generally as well as the principle of inquiry in social science and education. His psycho-political definition of multicultural education includes "content integration," "knowledge construction," "prejudice reduction," "equity pedagogy," and "an empowering school culture" and social structure. Banks makes his case and deflects criticism by constant use of ad hominem, tautology, and circular reasoning. For example: "the tendency of the public, teachers, administrators, and policy makers to oversimplify the concept" (13); "(The census projections . . . make) the Western traditionalists very afraid and nervous" (101); "throughout history, there have been two projects: 1) one to defend the dominant group, through the conceptualization of race and gender in antidemocratic ways, and 2) one to foster liberation, democracy and justice"; "Multicultural education is an education for freedom" (4).

Other statements such as: "School restructuring is needed for all students because of the high level of literacy and skills needed by citizens in a knowl-

edge society" or "an increasing percentage of the nations' school-age youths are victims of poverty" are unobjectionable and commonly accepted. Here, however, Banks implies a relationship to knowledge, the transmission of knowledge, and the public responsibility for schooling.

It is not new in the education discourse to simplify, instrumentalize, and make relative the language of science (see D. Ravitch, *Left Back*, Simon & Schuster, 2000). Here it reaches new heights. Everyone knows about the "Canon Battle" (27), but Banks defines opposition to canon change as opposition to replacement of "special interest history and literature . . . that emphasize(s) the primacy of the West and the history of European American males" (28), and attributes it to the interests of a small elite (who write "popular and educational publications" and "best-selling books," and, by the way, include the National Association of Scholars) (27). Less recognized as a knowledge issue generally is the way in which he subverts powerful intellectual and scientific terms to the service of multicultural education, for example, in "paradigms of cultural deprivation" and "cultural difference." Terms like "field sensitive students" (from Ramirez and Castaneda) refer only to "groups," and always with cultural reference. Cultures are "dynamic, complex and changing" (without a "definition that all social scientists would heartily accept"), but apparently not with any history or directionality outside Banks's worldview. Concepts guiding social inquiry drawn from Hilda Taba's work (64), and the example lesson in "developing a multicultural cur-

riculum," are in principle useful ways to help teachers implement curriculum content. Taba's concepts are, however, compromised in this curriculum. The lesson on "Columbus and the Arawaks" is intended to illustrate the historical bias of past historians. Instead it is itself an example of historical bias. The lesson then is intellectual intimidation, more culpable for being carried by educational exercises deriving from progressive, multicultural, feminist pedagogies that have political purpose but intellectual weakness.

The two premises basic to this pedagogical literature are "group" reference—specifically ethnic, racial, or gender groups—and the value of transformative or "constructivist" teaching and learning that leads "students to construct their own interpretations," moral choices, and social actions. Of course students are led in this "ideological war" (99). The language is driven by imperative auxiliaries: "must," "will," "will have to," "need to," "needs to be," etc. Group reference is so permeated by contradictions and simplistic generalizations that it would take a separate essay to dissect it, so rather than cite innumerable illustrations I will discuss the general position and some glaring specific contradictions.

Since Banks generally uses the terminology "white" and "African American," I suppose with an intention I do not share, I shall use "black," "white," "Asian," or "Hispanic" as more economical than hyphenated "American" terms, except where the reference is clearly to origin. It is a tired tactic of disaffected (white) liberals to attempt to mobilize politically by reference to a "common enemy," but

it is an illogic too common for a book or a literature. If the example is ever understood by the weakened European culture, or by the emasculated Asian culture—growing in numbers according to Banks—the competition to diminish the "other" will intensify, to the detriment of alleged goals of "multicultural education." One is reminded of three centuries of European wars over territory that subjugated cultures but never destroyed them. Only totalitarian European governments of the twentieth century attempted to blur cultures into a gray mass, justified by an ideology of equality, and friendly to no ethnic culture. Thus, theoretically destroying "white" history or ethnicity is no different from destroying "black" history or ethnicity, and neither has anything to do socially and educationally with addressing disability, sexuality—meaning homosexuality in this context, or gender roles—which are constructed socially and not in the closed circles of feminist research.

"People of color," treated as a group by Banks, have important respective differences in the culture complex of language, spirituality, work habits, epistemologies, and moral and religious beliefs. Overlaps, as well as differences, are dimensional rather than color-aggregated. To take the analogy of language, Banks regularly uses the example of "ebonics" to show a need for tolerance of others. He does not make a case for all to learn Spanish as a second language, and certainly not for a Chinese language. He believes that "just Americans" have taken from others culturally without acknowledging what they've taken (59). (A strange criticism from

someone speaking for a “multicultural” revision of a cultural infrastructure that has been more friendly than any other to continual adaptations.) The spread of the English language in the world is no doubt due to Colonialism, but it is also due to the versatility of the language—its ability to accommodate new forms and vocabulary into its formal structure. In other words, English evolved as a single language, with few inferior dialects. Where those dialects persist, parents generally do not prefer their children to carry them as a cultural identification.

Banks sets up explicitly an opposition between “Whites and people of color” (43), whom he respectively valorizes. Not only is this socially and historically incorrect as a generalization, but it also denies the very argument that has drawn general public support for diversity actions in education, i.e., that good and evil, opportunity and lack of it, and talent and ignorance have been and are distributed in ways that approach randomness among populations and over historical periods. The black Americans and the white Americans whom I know and respect have not depended on multicultural politics either for their identity or their achievement. We have all been affected by the conditions of times and places, but are finally, in America, what we are because of whom we have chosen to become. It is a waste of education to encourage black students universally to think of “multiculturalism” as a special interest for them, in place of the intellectual tradition in all its faces and according to its inherent value, and themselves as actors in the future unfolding of that tradition.

In the genre that this book represents, groups of “people of color” are co-opted as they fit the stereotypical attack against the ever-shrinking category of the dominant (57). The fallacy here is twofold, at least. First that the co-optation has to be selective to a specific argument when it goes beyond gross generalization (e.g., comparability of Asian immigrants economically, comparability of Indian nations in culture characteristics), and second, that the whites, or sometimes, Anglo-Saxon Protestants, or sometimes white European males are stripped of their own achievement in the human struggle, individually and as nation builders in the only countries Banks cites for multicultural action (protest).

The democratic ideologies institutionalized within the major democratic Western nations and the wide gap between these ideals and realities . . . resulted in the use of ethnic revitalization movements in . . . The United States, Canada and the United Kingdom (82).

With what cultural values does Banks think this institutionalization took place? Even more troubling is the treatment of “American” culture, of the mainstream and of globalization. Banks criticizes white college students as viewing themselves as non-cultural and non-ethnic: “I am ‘just American’ reveals the privileged position of an individual who is proclaiming his or her own unique culture as American and other cultures as non-American” (91). I know of no evidence of that assertion, and certainly not of its attributed causation. If the attitude is prevalent, it might just as well be attributable to the success of building an “*e pluribus unum*.” Banks wants to refor-

mulate the *unum* (8), but apparently from a *pluribus* that emerges vaguely out of the disappearance of the “dominant” culture. What does the “mainstream” he opposes mean, and what would its disappearance imply for the way decisions should be made for the polity? Prior to these questions, however, is the questionable relegation of Western culture to the dustbin of history and, at the other end of the continuum, the relegation of “global” concerns to irrelevance or even threat to the American multicultural agenda (23). I am not less devoted to my Anglo-Saxon culture for being devoted to the American *unum*; if I am privileged, it is not as a gift from my grandparents. If I believe in American institutions, it is because they have worked historically toward the very goals Banks proclaims. If I choose my literature on criteria of literary or scientific quality, I am subscribing to a model for reformulating the mainstream that has a legitimacy not provided in Banks’s insistence that Anglo dominance or Anglo hegemony have caused (25) rather than mitigated conflict and categorical inequality.

I have concerned myself more with knowledge and society here than with the institution of education as such, with pedagogy. The epistemological crisis, although new in our historical moment, is born of the contemporary socio-political (r)evolution, and undergirds what are seen as institutional failures in education. The social platitudes and wishes for a just society in this book are unarguable. The school and teaching sections, within the twentieth-century consensus of professional educators,

may be contributory. The call in chapter 4 for emphasizing achievement of all pupils especially in science and technology, for a closer connection of school to workforce needs, for attention to the quality and status of teachers, for recognition of the damage that the economy and society can do to the learning motivation of children and youth—all are unassailable among conscientious citizens. Problematic is their submergence into an anti-intellectual pedagogy, their degeneration into “bi-group preferences” (45), their politicization *within* education, their reinterpretation of the role of the school in cultural and individual conditioning. (Suggestion: Read page 47 and remember *A Clockwork Orange*.)

In sum, this book is not about knowledge, or teaching, or social wholeness as it purports to be. It is about race. And it is not a ringing affirmation of African-American contributions to the United States, nor is it at all an endorsement of African cultural values and virtues. Rather, it is a defense of minority underachievement, which whines into tedium, into an attack on what is left of European culture, and also into a political co-optation of all non-white ethnicities.

Banks’s writing has seemed to help my students understand the legitimate aspects of learning about and profiting from different cultural histories, but also the political motivations in the particular epistemologies of multiculturalism that have influenced the literature of education. This book is a reductionist example of the latter, with little significant or untainted material representing the former. If you read the glossary you

have read the book. It is sadly representative of what has become the norm, not only in social criticism of education, but also in the methodology of teaching (“the teacher education market in multicultural education is now a substantial one,” Banks, 9). As Robert Kaplan concluded in an essay for *The Atlantic Monthly*, reprinted in S. J. Goodlad’s *The Last Best Hope* (Jossey-Bass, 2001): “at the end of the twentieth century we are the very essence of creativity and dynamism. We are poised to transform ourselves

into something perhaps quite different from what we imagine.”

And the social meaning of the cautions we raise here will only be known in a future that we can but dimly imagine.

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The Society for Music Theory’s conference “Feminist Theory and Music 7: Crossing Cultures/Crossing Disciplines” took place in July 2003. Below is a call for papers reportedly from their list-serve.

One focus of this year’s conference will be feminist theory in cross-cultural perspective. How have feminist political concerns shaped, and been shaped by, ethnomusicology, ethnographic approaches, and multicultural music pedagogy? As always, the FT&M Conference welcomes contributions drawing on feminism, women’s studies, LGBT or queer studies, area studies/ethnic studies (eg. Africana, Asian, Latin American) and gender studies from all disciplinary perspectives of musical inquiry.